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Abstract In a recent no-go theorem [Bong et al, Nature Physics (to appear)], we proved
that the predictions of unitary quantum mechanics for an extended Wigner’s friend scenario
are incompatible with any theory satisfying three metaphysical assumptions, the conjunction
of which we call “Local Friendliness”: ABSOLUTENESS OF OBSERVED EVENTS, LOCAL-
ITY and NO-SUPERDETERMINISM. In this paper (based on an invited talk for the QBism
jubilee at the 2019 Va¨xjo¨ conference) I discuss the implications of this theorem for QBism,
as seen from the perspective of experimental metaphysics. I argue that the key distinction be-
tween QBism and realist interpretations of quantum mechanics is best understood in terms
of their adherence to different theories of truth: the pragmatist versus the correspondence
theories. I argue that a productive pathway to resolve the measurement problem within a
pragmatist view involves taking seriously the perspective of quantum betting agents, even
those in what I call a “Wigner bubble”. The notion of reality afforded by QBism, I propose,
will correspond to the invariant elements of any theory that has pragmatic value to all rational
agents—that is, the elements that are invariant upon changes of agent perspectives. The clas-
sical notion of ‘event’ is not among those invariants, even when those events are observed
by some agent. Neither are quantum states. Nevertheless, I argue that far from solipsism, a
personalist view of quantum states is an expression of its precise opposite: Copernicanism.
1 Introduction
Firstly I should say that I dont consider myself to be a QBist. If anything, I prefer to think
of myself as an experimental metaphysicist1 [1], following the term introduced by Abner
Shimony [2] to refer to the field that has Bell’s 1964 theorem [3] as its pioneering result.
That is, I am interested in studying the landscape of metaphysically possible theories, and
finding ways to rule out classes of such theories via theorems and experiments. The objects
E. G. Cavalcanti
Centre for Quantum Dynamics, Griffith University, Gold Coast, QLD 4222, Australia
E-mail: e.cavalcanti@griffith.edu.au
1 I am aware that philosophers who work on metaphysics are called “metaphysicians”. I use “metaphysi-
cist” to refer to physicists who work on (experimental) metaphysics.
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Fig. 1 Left: a representation of the landscape of physical theories. Right: William James during a visit to
Brazil in 1865 and the hat I wish I was wearing while giving the talk this paper is based on.
of study of experimental metaphysics are physical theories (thus the prefix “meta”)2 and
their relationship to the world of observation (thus the adjective “experimental”).
In relating theory to observation, one must extract the predictions of the theory from the
perspective of users of the theory. This is called the “operational theory”. QBism plays a
special role among interpretations of quantum mechanics for being the quantum operational
theory par excellence. In general, two or more theories in the same operational equivalence
class can have distinct ontologies—that is, they have different commitments about what
elements of the theory, if any, are taken to be real and objective. Although most physicists
have strong opinions about one or another ontological theory, experimental metaphysics
aims to remain agnostic about philosophical commitments that are not implied by theorems
or by experiment.
There’s a story, I dont know if it’s apocryphal, but it’s a nice one, according to which
Michelangelo, when asked about how he sculpted David, said: “I just removed anything that
was not David”. I like to think of the metaphysical landscape as the raw block of marble—
with different points in the block corresponding to different physical theories—and of exper-
imental metaphysics as a chisel to carve the marble, eliminating corners that do not describe
the world of our experience. It may turn out that we are unable to reduce the block to a single
point, corresponding to the one true “theory of everything”3. But we may hope that after we
carve out all the bits that experiment allows us to, what remains forms a beautiful whole4.
To appreciate and understand this landscape, a theorist must be comfortable with “wearing
the hat” of different interpretations from time to time.
2 In the same sense as “metamathematics”—the field that has mathematical theories as its object of study,
and Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem as its most prominent result.
3 In fact, this is most likely impossible, a fact that philosophers refer to as the “underdetermination of
theory by evidence”. For example, any set of publicly shared observations can always be described within a
deterministic single-world theory, simply by adding a sufficient number of hidden variables and allowing the
laws of physics to have a sufficiently complex mathematical form. There would no doubt be reasons to reject
ad-hoc theories of this kind via some philosophical criteria, but they cannot be ruled out as impossible.
4 Note that I am not advocating beauty as a criterion for truth, a view that has been recently criticised as
unproductive for physics [4]. Every theory in the landscape is probably “ugly” by some physicists’ aesthetic
judgement. I’ll return to the question of truth later in this paper.
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In this paper I write with my QBist hat on. I want to contribute an argument against
a charge commonly levied at QBism, that its insistence in interpreting quantum states as
degrees of belief of individual agents amounts to solipsism. That is, to the idea that the only
thing that exists is my own mind (or at any rate, the mind of whoever entertains solipsism). I
will argue that, on the contrary, the personalist view of quantum states can be justified from
a premise that is the precise opposite of solipsism, namely Copernicanism—the idea that no
individual agent is at the center of the universe. I also argue that taking this idea seriously
requires a radical revision of the classical notion of “event”, and by extension, of space-time.
The story that I want to elaborate on here goes back to an argument I proposed to Chris
Fuchs in Vienna in 2007. I recounted the argument in an email to Chris on February 2008,
which was published on the arxiv in 2014 [5], as part of the second instalment of his “samiz-
dat” series. For context, I reproduce it below:
Cavalcanti-ism 1: By the way, the argument I gave in Vienna, now that I remem-
bered, was along these lines:
Suppose you believe that (i) A quantum state is just an encapsulation of your
subjective degrees of belief; (ii) The lesson of Kochen-Specker and Bell’s theorems
is that there are no objective facts to further specify your degrees of belief even in
principle, at least in the cases where you assign a pure state to a situation; and (iii)
You are no more central to the universe than any other agent.
Then considering a Wigner’s friend scenario, assumptions (i) and (ii) imply that
before you look into the box where your friend is measuring a quantum system,
you cannot assign a reality to the measurement outcome of your friend. However,
assumption (iii) makes you believe that your friend can assign a definite outcome,
whichever it is. That implies that as far as you are concerned, before you open
the box that event of your friend measuring the system never happened. But you
believe that relative to your friend it did happen. You conclude that the very exis-
tence of ‘events’ is relative to the observer. The world is not made of a collection of
events aspersed in space-time, with well-defined causal relations between each pair
of events, and between each event and each observer.
To reinforce that view, you can devise two situations: in one you open the box
and ask your friend “Did you see any outcome before I opened the box?”. Of course
she’ll say your opening the box had no influence on that, and by assumption (iii)
you’ll believe her. So you do the same experiment, but now you perform a transfor-
mation that takes all the contents of the box, including your friend, back to its initial
state, a little time after you presume the measurement has been done. The fact that
the evolution was fully reversible is evidence of the fact that your friend was still in a
coherent entangled state with the measurement apparatus, and therefore by (ii) you
believe there’s no objective fact of the matter relative to you as to which outcome
she observed, and since you coherently reversed the interaction, there never will be.
Yet, you still believe that relative to her own previous position as an observer inside
the box, she must have observed something before you reversed the whole thing. But
that observation is forever outside any causal relation with you or even your cur-
rent time-reversed friend. In other words, that event is in a sense not in the same
space-time as you are now.
Now this is an argument that has some traction for QBists, who already accept its
premises, but not so much for someone who doesn’t. Here I want to present a much stronger
and more formal version of that argument, based on our recent “Local Friendliness the-
orem” [6]—a strong no-go theorem on the Wigner’s friend paradox. It does not assume
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anything about the nature of quantum states, or indeed any assumption specific about quan-
tum theory—it is in this sense “theory-independent”. The theorem demonstrates that three
metaphysical assumptions, namely ABSOLUTENESS OF OBSERVED EVENTS, LOCALITY
and NO-SUPERDETERMINISM (the conjunction of which we call LOCAL FRIENDLINESS)
lead to certain inequalities (the “Local Friendliness (LF) inequalities”), that are in principle5
violated by quantum correlations in an extended version of Wigner’s friend scenario. The
metaphysical assumptions of the theorem are strictly weaker than those of Bell’s theorem,
thus ruling out a larger class of theories. In particular, the LOCALITY assumption—that
a local choice of measurement cannot have influences in space-like separated regions—is
strictly weaker than Bell’s notion of Local Causality.
This paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 I set the stage by reviewing Wigner’s
original thought-experiment and argument. In Section 3 I briefly review the Local Friendli-
ness theorem [6] and discuss how it is strictly stronger than Bell’s theorem. I also provide a
criticism of the QBist response to Bell’s theorem. In Section 4 I consider the perspective of
the friend as a rational gambling agent, discuss the pitfalls of defining joint probabilities in
Wigner’s friend scenarios, and analyse what we learn in that respect from a thought experi-
ment first proposed by Deutsch [9]. In Section 5 I analyse the QBist perspective, including
how it requires a distinction between pragmatic and correspondence conceptions of truth,
and outline a framework for making sense of pragmatic probabilities in Wigner’s friend sce-
narios. I conclude by revisiting my 2007 argument to Chris and suggesting directions for
further research.
2 Wigner’s original argument
In his 1961 paper [10] where the “friend paradox” is introduced, Wigner starts by setting
out a view of quantum states similar to that of QBism: i.e. that quantum states are states of
knowledge:
The wave function is only a suitable language for describing the body of knowledge—
gained by observations—which is relevant for predicting the future behaviour of the
system. For this reason, the interactions which may create one or another sensa-
tion in us are also called observations, or measurements. One realises that all the
information which the laws of physics provide consists of probability connections
between subsequent impressions that a system makes on one if one interacts with it
repeatedly, i.e., if one makes repeated measurements on it. ([10], p. 174)
That he holds a subjective view of quantum states is further evidenced by this later
passage:
...it is the entering of an impression into our consciousness which alters the
wave function because it modifies our appraisal of the probabilities for different
impressions which we expect to receive in the future. ([10], p. 175-176)
He also considers the wave function to provide a complete description of such knowl-
edge:
Given any object, all the possible knowledge concerning that object can be given
as its wave function. ([10], p. 173)
5 And in practice LF inequalities have already been violated by the experiments of [7,6], with single quan-
tum systems playing the role of “observers”. For some interpretations (e.g. relational quantum mechanics [8]),
this is sufficient evidence. I will return later to the status of these experiments for QBism.
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Furthermore, he assumes that the information about the wavefunction of a system ob-
tained by any agent is communicable:
The information given by the wave function is communicable. If someone else
somehow determines the wave function of a system, he can tell me about it and,
according to the theory, the probabilities for the possible different impressions (or
“sensations”) will be equally large, no matter whether he or I interact with the
system in a given fashion. In this sense, the wave function “exists.” ([10], p. 173)
After these preliminary considerations, he goes on to consider the “friend” scenario:
It is natural to inquire about the situation if one does not make the observation
oneself but lets someone else carry it out. (...) One could attribute a wave function to
the joint system: friend plus object, and this joint system would have a wave function
also after the interaction, that is, after my friend has looked. ([10], p. 176)
Wigner considers a situation where a system S is initially prepared in a quantum state
|ψ0〉S = α|0〉S + β |1〉S, and subsequently measured by the friend in the {|0〉S, |1〉S} ba-
sis. After observing the outcome of this meaurement, the friend assigns to the system one
or the other of the two states |0〉S or |1〉S. From Wigner’s perspective, however, as a re-
sult of this interaction, the system and friend are described by an entangled quantum state,
|Ψ1〉SF =α|0〉S|O0〉F +β |1〉S|O1〉F , where |O0〉F and |O1〉F describe states where the friend
has observed outcomes 0 and 1, respectively. He then goes on to argue that:
This is a contradiction, because the state described by the wave function [|Ψ1〉SF ]
describes a state that has properties which neither [|0〉S|O0〉F ] nor [|1〉S|O1〉F ] has.
([10], p. 180)
From this he concludes:
It follows that the being with a consciousness must have a different role in quan-
tum mechanics than the inanimate measuring device: the atom considered above.
In particular, the quantum mechanical equations of motion cannot be linear if the
preceding argument is accepted. ([10], p. 180)
In other words, Wigner was defending a theory in which conscious observation causes
the nonlinear collapse of the wavefunction. If this hypothesis is correct, Wigner’s subsequent
observations on the system composed of S and F would not be adequately described by
|Ψ1〉SF , but rather by one or the other of the states assigning a well-defined value to the
friend’s observation.
He goes on to discuss that there is not necessarily a contradiction from the point of view
of orthodox quantum mechanics, if one denies that there is any meaning to questions about
what the friend has actually observed. “However, to deny the existence of the conscious-
ness of a friend to this extent is surely an unnatural attitude, approaching solipsism”, he
concludes.6
6 Incidentally, Wigner neglects another alternative, compatible with his interpretation of the quantum state
as encoding information: a psi-epistemic [11] theory. If instead of quantum states we were talking about clas-
sical probability distributions, there would be no contradiction between the friend observing a coin landing
heads and thus assigning probability 1 to that event, while at the same time Wigner assigning it probability
1/2. This way out, if applied to the quantum case, would amount to a theory where quantum states represent
states of information about an underlying reality (unlike in QBism, in which they are an agent’s information
about the outcomes of potential observations on the system). A psi-epistemic theory would however contra-
dict Wigner’s premise that a pure quantum state provides a complete description of the system. In any case, we
now have several no-go theorems and experimental results putting strong constraints on such theories [12,13,
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Importantly, Wigner’s proposed solution is an operationally distinct theory. He predicts,
via his argument, that the quantum state |Ψ1〉SF would give wrong predictions for Wigner—
e.g. no interference effects could be observed. This is an empirical matter, which cannot
be decided by argumentation alone. I shall leave this empirical question for future experi-
ments to decide, perhaps with human-level AI agents running in sufficiently large quantum
computers.
If Wigner’s conjecture turns out to be incorrect, this would in particular imply that Lo-
cal Friendliness inequalities can be violated with conscious observers. In the next section I
review the derivation of those inequalities, before discussing the implications of their (po-
tential) violation.
3 The Local Friendliness theorem
For brevity, I will not review all of the technical details of the Local Friendliness theorem
here, but refer the reader to [6]. For the present purposes, the following summary is suffi-
cient.
The theorem considers an extended Wigner’s friend scenario (EWFS), which is a bipar-
tite version of Wigners friend thought experiment introduced by Caslav Brukner [16,17]. In
this scenario, there are two “friends” (called Charlie and Debbie) in isolated labs controlled
by the “superobservers” Alice and Bob respectively. Charlie and Debbie share an entangled
state, on which they perform a measurement in a fixed basis, obtaining outcomes labelled c
and d respectively. In each run of the experiment, Alice chooses (by conditioning on a free
external variable) to perform one of N measurements, labelled by x, obtaining an outcome
labelled a. When Alice chooses x = 1, she opens Charlie’s lab and asks what he observed
(c), then assigns the same value, a = c, to her outcome. Likewise, when Bob chooses y = 1,
he asks Debbie what she saw and assigns b = d to his outcome. The other values of x and
y (∈ {2, ...,N}) correspond to performing some other measurement on the contents of the
respective lab—including the friend. These can, in general, be incompatible with the mea-
surements associated with x = y = 1.
In [6] we call LOCAL FRIENDLINESS the conjunction of three assumptions: ABSO-
LUTENESS OF OBSERVED EVENTS, NO-SUPERDETERMINISM and LOCALITY.
Assumption 1 (ABSOLUTENESS OF OBSERVED EVENTS (AOE)). An observed event is
a real single event, and not relative to anything or anyone.
In other words, this is the assumption that in each run of the experiment, there is a
well-defined value associated with the actually observed outcomes of every observer (i.e.
the variables a,b,c,d). Note that this is not the assumption that every observable has a well-
defined value; it does not contradict Peres’ dictum that “unperformed experiments have no
results” [18]. It is the assumption that performed experiments have absolute (i.e. observer-
independent) results. Note in particular that when x = 1 (corresponding to Alice opening
the lab and asking Charlie for his observed outcome c), the unperformed measurements
corresponding to the observables associated with x 6= 1 are not assumed to have a well-
defined outcome. Likewise for y = 1.
14,15]. Furthermore, the collapse theory advocated by Wigner undermines his premise that the quantum state
represents subjective information, since in such a theory the wavefunction that Wigner ought to attribute to
the situation changes with the friend’s observation, even before that information is communicated to Wigner.
In such a theory the wavefunction seems to acquire a much more objective character.
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Assumption 2 (NO-SUPERDETERMINISM (NSD)). Any set of events on a space-like hy-
persurface is uncorrelated with any set of freely chosen actions subsequent to that space-like
hypersurface.
This assumption is analogous to the “Freedom of Choice” assumption in proofs of Bell’s
theorem, but is stated in a more precise manner, following [19]. As in Bell’s theorem, it does
not require “free will” on the part of the agents, but only that there exist external variables
that are not a priori correlated with any of the other relevant variables in the experiment, and
that the choices of measurement can be made conditional on such variables.
Assumption 3 (LOCALITY (LOC)). The probability of an observable event e is unchanged
by conditioning on a space-like-separated free choice z, even if it is already conditioned on
other events not in the future light-cone of z.
In other words, LOCALITY prohibits faster-than-light causation in probabilistic theories,
and is weaker than Bell’s notion of Local Causality7.
The conjunction of these assumptions (i.e. LOCAL FRIENDLINESS) is not sufficient to
derive Bell inequalities, as we show in [6] (and see also [19]). As briefly mentioned in
[6], Assumptions 2 and 3 can be replaced by the single assumption of LOCAL ACTION,
introduced in [19]8.
Assumption 2’ (LOCAL ACTION (LA)). The only relevant events correlated with a free
choice are in its future light cone.
The Local Friendliness theorem can then be stated as:
Theorem 1 (LOCAL FRIENDLINESS theorem). No theory satisfying Assumptions 1, 2 and
3 (or alternatively, Assumptions 1 and 2’) can reproduce the predictions of unitary quantum
mechanics for an extended Wigner’s friend scenario.
By “the predictions of unitary quantum mechanics for an extended Wigner’s friend sce-
nario” I mean the empirical probabilities P(a,b|x,y) for the observations by Alice and Bob,
under the assumption that they are technologically able to perform (sufficiently) coherent
quantum operations on the observers Charlie and Debbie. The proof proceeds by showing
(in a theory-independent way) that LOCAL FRIENDLINESS implies constraints in the proba-
bilities P(a,b|x,y) for an extended Wigner’s friend scenario (the LF inequalities), which can
in principle be violated in a quantum implementation of the EWFS. This violation can be
demonstrated already for a scenario involving only one friend (say, Charlie) entangled with
a quantum system measured by the distant party (in this case, Bob) [6]. I will henceforth
focus on this simpler scenario.
In the quantum-mechanical description for this scenario, Alice and Bob are in distant
laboratories, and in possession of two qubits SA (in Alice’s lab) and SB (in Bob’s lab) initially
prepared in an entangled state
|ψ0〉SASB = α|0〉SA |0〉SB +β |1〉SA |1〉SB . (1)
Charlie (who is described by Alice via a Hilbert spaceHF and initially assigned a “ready”state
|R〉F ) measures system SA on a fixed basis (say, the computational basis {|0〉SA , |1〉SA}).
Charlie’s measurement is described by Alice via an unitary evolution U1 acting on HF ⊗
HSA that effects the transformations U1|0〉SA |R〉F = |0〉SA |O0〉F and U1|1〉SA |R〉F = |1〉SA |O1〉F ,
7 Recall that Local Causality can be parsed as the conjunction of two assumptions: “Parameter Indepen-
dence” and “Outcome Independence” [20]. LOCALITY is equivalent to “Parameter Independence”.
8 In [19] this notion was called “Local Agency”.
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where |Oc〉F represents a state where Charlie has observed outcome ‘c’. By linearity, after
Charlie’s measurement is completed, Alice’s state assignment to the system composed of
Charlie and the two entangled qubits is:
|Ψ1〉SASBF =U1|ψ0〉SASB |R〉F = α|0〉SA |0〉SB |O0〉F +β |1〉SA |1〉SB |O1〉F . (2)
Alice’s measurement for x = 1 corresponds to measuring Charlie’s state in the “pointer
basis”—that is, asking Charlie what he saw9, and setting her outcome a = c. Alice’s mea-
surements for x 6= 1 are implemented by applying the reverse unitary U†1 (coherently erasing
Charlies “memory” in the process, and returning the total system to state |ψ0〉SASB |R〉F ), then
proceeding to perform a measurement Mx on system SA alone (for x ∈ {2, ...,N}), with out-
comes labelled by a. Bob performs a measurement My on system SB (for a randomly chosen
y ∈ {1, ...,N}), with outcomes labelled by b. As shown (theoretically and experimentally) in
[6], there exist choices of measurements for Alice and Bob such that the resulting statistics
p(a,b|x,y) violates a Local Friendliness inequality10.
This implementation realises an extended version of the scenario in my 2007 argu-
ment to Chris, reproduced in Section 1. The LF theorem however represents a formally
stronger argument. The resolution, for a QBist, is the rejection of ABSOLUTENESS OF
OBSERVED EVENTS, but the LF theorem provides an argument for this conclusion that
holds weight for anyone who wishes to maintain the validity of LOCAL ACTION, or of NO-
SUPERDETERMINISM and LOCALITY. Although the theorem can be resolved by rejecting
one of the other assumptions, I want to now focus on the implications of taking the route of
rejecting AOE.
3.1 Relationship to Bell’s theorem and quantum causal models
As shown in [6], the LF inequalities obtained for a given number of settings and outcomes in
an EWFS are the tight facets of a convex polytope11. The LF polytope strictly contains the
set of correlations compatible with a local hidden variable model (the Bell-local polytope).
This fact illustrates an important point: the LF theorem is strictly stronger than Bells theo-
rem, that is, the LF inequalities are derived from a strictly weaker set of assumptions. A suf-
ficient extra assumption to derive a Bell inequality would be “Outcome Independence” [6]
(or “Predetermination” [19], which implies Outcome Independence[1]). Rejecting Outcome
Independence is a popular alternative to resolve Bell’s theorem. Shimony [20] argued that
while violation of LOCALITY is a case of “action-at-a-distance”, violation of Outcome In-
dependence represents a milder case of “passion-at-a-distance”, allowing for a “peaceful
coexistence” between quantum mechanics and relativity. To resolve the LF theorem, how-
ever, this alternative is no longer sufficient; one needs to reject something else—namely, at
least one of the assumptions above.
9 Based on Eq. (2), this should produce the same result as if Alice measured the system SA directly on the
computational basis, which she can do subsequently to check for consistency with Charlie’s report.
10 In a scenario with a single friend, this is the class of “semi-Brukner” inequalities [6].
11 The LF polytopes were studied independently by Erik Woodhead [21] (who called them “partially de-
terministic polytopes”) in the context of device-independent randomness certification in the presence of no-
signalling adversaries. The term “partially deterministic” refers to the fact that unlike in a Bell-local model
(where all observables in the scenario can be modelled via a local deterministic response function), only a
subset of the observables have deterministic values in the model—those that are always measured by the
friend in every run.
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Another route to resolve Bells theorem is to modify the classical framework of causality,
e.g. by modifying Reichenbachs Principle of Common Cause12. In [22], we proposed to
break Reichenbach’s principle into two independent principles, the Principle of Common
Cause and (in the terminology of [19]) the Principle of Decorrelating Explanation. We then
proposed that one alternative to resolve Bell’s theorem was to maintain the Principle of
Common Cause but reject Decorrelating Explanation, replacing it by a quantum version that
only requires that the quantum channels factorise in a certain way. This quantum version of
Reichenbach’s principle has been implemented in various frameworks for quantum causal
models [23,24,25].
However, simply rejecting Decorrelating Explanation is not enough, for a similar reason
as it is not enough to reject Outcome Independence. This can be seen by noting that LOCAL
FRIENDLINESS is tacitly assumed in quantum causal models (as well as in classical causal
models). To take the lesson of Wigners friend seriously in a theory maintaining LA, we need
something more radical: to challenge the idea that observed events have absolute reality13.
3.2 A criticism of the QBist response to Bell’s theorem
A critical note here is in order: In [26], Fuchs, Mermin and Schack (essentially) propose that
the rejection of AOE also as a resolution for Bell’s theorem. After a discussion of how for
Wigner’s friend “the paradox vanishes with the recognition that a measurement outcome is
personal to the experiencing agent”, they go on to say:
This is relevant to the usual nonlocality story, in which Alice and Bob agree on a
particular entangled state assignment to a pair of systems, one near Alice, the other
near Bob. Each then makes a measurement on their nearby system. In the usual
story the outcomes are implicitly assumed to come into existence at the site of each
measurement at the moment that measurement is performed.
What the usual story overlooks is that the coming into existence of a particu-
lar measurement outcome is valid only for the agent experiencing that outcome. At
the moment of his own measurement Bob is playing the friend to Alice’s far-away
Wigner, just as at the moment of her own measurement she is playing the friend to
Bob’s Wigner. Although each of them experiences an outcome to their own measure-
ment, they can experience an outcome to the measurement undertaken by the other
only when they receive the other’s report. Each of them applies quantum mechanics
in the only way in which it can be applied, to account for the correlations in two
measurement outcomes registered in his or her own individual experience. And as
noted above, experiences of a single agent are necessarily time-like separated. The
issue of nonlocality simply does not arise.
This argument however goes too far: if you accept its validity for the case of Bell cor-
relations, then nothing could possibly count as evidence of nonlocality, not even if Alice
and Bob could construct a “Bell telephone” and communicate with faster-than-light signals!
Furthermore, it does not cohere well with the QBist depiction of measurement devices as
“prosthetic hands, to make it clear that they should be considered an integral part of the
12 Reichenbach’s principle says that if two events A and B are correlated, then either one is the cause of the
other, or they share a common cause C such that A and B are uncorrelated when conditioned on C.
13 I will discuss the implications of the LF theorem for quantum causality in more detail in an upcoming
paper.
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agent” [27]. If Alice’s measurement device is an extension of herself, then when the de-
vice goes “click”, it goes “click” for Alice. But in this case, what difference does it make
if the device is at a certain distance from Alice’s sensory apparatus? And what if Alice
has two devices, one in each room, and they both go “click”? Consider also a QBist who
has the pragmatic pursuit to create a startup company to sell device-independent quantum-
key-distribution devices. How are they going to explain to their prospective clients how the
devices work if they refuse to even talk about space-like separated events? All of this sug-
gests that the QBist story about Bell experiments has to be much more nuanced than what
was suggested in [26].
Instead, I suggest there is a level of description of the world in which it makes pragmatic
sense to talk about space-like separated events, e.g. in terms of what evidence would be suf-
ficient for an agent to be satisfied that two events (about which they either have information
or expect to receive information) happened in space-like separated regions, such as by syn-
chronising clocks via appropriate light signals, etc. There is also a level of description in
which it makes pragmatic sense to talk about a joint probability distribution for two space-
like separated events such as the clicks of Alice’s two detectors located in separate rooms.
For example, suppose Bob proposes to bet with Alice that she cannot demonstrate Bell in-
equality violations, selling a ticket: “Pay $100,000 if the correlations between space-like
separated clicks between the two detectors in Alice’s labs 1 and 2 violate a Bell inequality
by at least 1 standard deviation after 1000 runs. Charlie will act as a trusted referee to verify
that the conditions of a Bell scenario are met”. Alice would not be sufficiently pragmatic if
she refuses the gamble by saying “there’s no such thing as space-like separated events”!
That is, even if ultimately Alice will only learn about the click in the distant lab some
time in her own future, she has at hand a set of well-defined operational criteria to “project”
the distant event as having occurred in a distant lab some time before she received the news.
She can then ask, for example, whether the correlations between a series of such events can
be explained in terms of common causes in their common past light-cone (which also has
an operationally well-defined meaning for the purposes at hand). She will find that viola-
tion of Bell inequalities implies that no classical common cause explanation exists. In this
case, a QBist Alice ought to reject the Principle of Decorrelating Explanation, but she has
good pragmatic reasons to retain the Principle of Common Cause. For example, she should
definitely be surprised if the two detectors violated a Bell inequality without any entangled
state as an input! In other words, for the purposes of ordinary Bell experiments, a QBist
Alice ought to use quantum causal models as an effective theory. It is only Wigner’s friend
experiments that force the QBist to appeal to a rejection of AOE.
But if the pragmatist rejects AOE in light of Wigner’s friend, doesn’t that mean it just
has to be rejected across the board? I suggest that a way to resolve this apparent conundrum
is for the pragmatist to emphasise that their gambles refer to potential outcomes of potential
observations they can make. If they have at hand, or can access, for example, a network of
rods, clocks and cameras, they can talk about events captured by those cameras as well as
their time and position as measured by the nearest rod and clock. If they have good reason
to think that an event has been captured by such a network of devices and its identity, time
and location can be certified by trustworthy means, they have sufficient grounds to bet on
where, when and what happened as recorded by those means. For ordinary situations, they
can then stop thinking of the network of devices and simply refer to the position and time of
potential events without any significant risk of contradiction.
Wigner’s friend scenarios, however, push the limits of this type of emergent description,
but they require a very specific and powerful kind of apparatus. For ordinary situations
with macroscopic human observers, where one does not have access to the experimental
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devices to realise a Wigner’s friend experiment, there is no contradiction for an agent in
taking the measurement devices’ clicks to have a definite outcome, relative to the agent’s
own perspective and capabilities. What Wigner’s friend scenarios tell the pragmatist is that
one should be wary of thinking of events as having absolute reality.
3.3 But isn’t that solipsism?
A common criticism of QBism is that it seems to amount to solipsism. Critics points to
statements like the following, which at face value seem to validate that opinion:
What quantum theory does is provide a framework for structuring MY expecta-
tions for the consequences of MY interventions upon the external world [28].
However, they also ignore the subsequent clarifications:
Why is this not solipsism? Because quantum theory is not a theory of everything.
It is not a statement of all that is and all that happens; it is not a mirror image of
nature. It is about me and the little part I play in the world, as gambled upon from
my perspective. But just as I can use quantum theory for my purposes, you can use
it for yours [28].
For QBism, even pure quantum states represent personalist degrees of belief, valid from
the perspective of an agent but not from a “God’s eye view”. This is unacceptable to some
critics, who may argue that a pure-state assignment can arise from the agent’s observation of
the outcome of an ideal measurement, and that any agent who observed the same outcome
would be forced to assign the same pure quantum state to the system.
The Local Friendliness theorem causes a difficulty (to those who choose to reject ABSO-
LUTENESS OF OBSERVED EVENTS as its resolution) for this argument: not even observed
events are, in general, elements of an absolute reality! But if the friend’s observations do not
have a definite reality from Wigner’s perspective, isn’t this, finally, “an unnatural attitude,
approaching solipsism”, as Wigner suggested?
It is not solipsism, following the second quote above, if Wigner’s friend is also an agent
that can use quantum theory for their own purposes.
4 Wigner’s friend takes a gamble
Following the hook from the previous section, let us now analyse further what it could mean
for Wigner’s friend to be a user of quantum theory.
Firstly, let us take some time to consider what it would take to realise an EWFS, where
the superobserver, Alice, can assign (something close to) a pure state to Charlie’s lab, and
perform (something close to) arbitrary unitaries upon it. This requires that Charlie’s lab is
maintained in isolation from decoherence with the external environment. It is hard to imag-
ine how to sufficiently isolate a human-habitable room to realise this condition. Even if
electromagnetic and nuclear interactions with the external environment could be eliminated
(which is already a stupendous task), gravitational interactions could perhaps still gener-
ate sufficient decoherence between any macroscopically distinct alternatives [29]. Perhaps
a black hole could provide the necessary isolation, but whether this is possible even in prin-
ciple is subject to the resolution of the black hole information paradox, and this is before
discussing how to realise the required control.
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Realistically, therefore, this scenario cannot be realised with human beings at all, but we
can imagine a sufficiently compelling realisation with an AI agent (perhaps in a simulated
lab environment) running in a sufficiently powerful quantum computer. Whether or not it
is required that the agent is conscious for it to count as an observer depends on one’s po-
sition on what it means to be an observer, or an agent. Within QBism, for a system to be
an agent it should be sufficient that it is a system endowed with the ability to use quantum
theory as a pragmatic guide to action. That is, it should be sufficient for the agent to be a
kind of system that can obtain information from other systems, and depending on what it
observes, place bets on the outcomes of its future observations. That is, it should be suffi-
cient to consider a simple version of a rational agent. A relatively simple AI program, with
access to information about quantum measurements, can satisfy these conditions, and it is
not far-fetched to consider a version of such a program running in a quantum computer. An
interesting question then is: what “rules of thought” should these agents be endowed with?
4.1 Beware of joint probabilities
In a recent paper, Baumann and Brukner (B-B) [30] considered the perspective of Wigners
friend as a rational agent. In the notation of the present paper, their goal was to obtain a pre-
scription for the probability P(a|c,x) that Charlie ought to assign, after observing outcome
c of his own measurement, to the outcome a of Alices measurement for some measurement
x 6= 1 (that is, when Alice measures Charlie’s lab on an incompatible basis).
In the B-B prescription: Charlie can use a “modified Born rule” to calculate a joint
probability distribution P(a,c|x) for the outcomes of Alice and Charlie, from which the
conditional P(c|a,x) = P(a,c|x)/(∑c P(a,c|x)) could be derived14. However, this prescrip-
tion implicitly assumes the validity of ABSOLUTENESS OF OBSERVED EVENTS, since it
assigns a joint probability distribution to the events observed by Alice and Charlie15. Via
the Local Friendliness theorem, this implies that the B-B prescription must violate LOCAL
ACTION. Indeed I will now show that this is the case.
The violation of LOCAL ACTION was not evident in the analysis of [30], in which only
one choice of measurement was considered for Alice. But considering just two measurement
choices, one can set up a situation where using the B-B prescription leads to P(c|x = 1) 6=
P(c|x = 2), i.e. where the probability Charlie assigns to his outcome depends on Alice’s
future choice of measurement.
The B-B prescription can be reformulated in our notation as follows. Consider a sce-
nario similar to that described in Sec. 3, but involving only Alice and Charlie, where a
d-dimensional system SA is initially prepared by Alice in state |φ0〉SA =∑d−1c=0 αc|c〉SA . Char-
lie’s measurement is described by Alice via an unitary U1, such that Alice’s state assignment
14 A more recent paper [31] proposes a few different alternative rules, within a Page-Wootters formalism for
relational time. I will not analyse all of those proposals here, but the main lesson from the Local Friendliness
theorem applies to any proposal that specifies a joint probability distribution to the outcomes of Charlie and
Alice.
15 AOE implies that there exists a joint probability distribution P(a,b,c|x,y) for the observed outcomes
of Alice, Bob and Charlie such that the observations by Alice and Bob are consistent with the marginals
P(a,b|x,y) = ∑c P(a,b,c|x,y). Marginalising over Bob’s outcomes instead, one obtains P(a,c|x,y) =
∑b P(a,b,c|x,y), and assuming LOCAL ACTION, this distribution must be independent of Bob’s choice of
measurement y, P(a,c|x,y) = P(a,c|x).
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for SAF after Charlie’s measurement is:
|Ψ1〉SAF =U1|φ0〉SA |R〉F =
d−1
∑
c=0
αc|c〉SA |Oc〉F . (3)
After Charlie’s measurement, Alice performs a measurement on SAF using an apparatus
we denote as system A16. This measurement is described via an unitary Vx (where I introduce
the subscript x to denote more than one choice of measurement by Alice) acting on the de-
vice’s initial “ready” state |R〉A and the composite system SAF , effecting the transformations
Vx|Ψ xa 〉SAF |R〉A = |Ψ xa 〉SAF |Oxa〉A17, thus leading to an overall state
|Φxtot〉SAFA =Vx|Ψ1〉SAF |R〉A =∑
c,a
γxc,a|Ψ xa 〉SAF |Oxa〉A, (4)
where |Oxa〉A describes the state of A having registered outcome a for measurement x, and
γxc,a = αc〈Ψ xa |c,Oc〉SAF . Following their prescription, the joint probability P(a,c|x) for Al-
ice’s and Charlie’s outcomes, given that Alice has performed measurement x, is given by the
“modified Born rule”
P(a,c|x) = Tr{(1SA ⊗ [Oc]F ⊗ [Oxa]A) [Φxtot ]} , (5)
where [S]Y denotes a projector onto state |S〉Y .
Now let x = 1 denote Alice’s measurement of the same observable as Charlie, or equiv-
alently, asking Charlie what he saw. In this case |Ψ x=1a 〉SAF = |a〉SA |Oa〉F , and
|Φx=1tot 〉SAFA =∑
c
αc|c〉SA |Oc〉F |Ox=1a=c〉A, (6)
and it follows from Eq. (5) that P(a,c|x = 1) = δa,c|αc|2. Therefore
P(c|x = 1) =∑
a
P(a,c|x = 1) = |αc|2. (7)
Alternatively, let Alice’s measurement x = 2 be specified by an orthogonal set of states
|Ψ x=2a 〉SAF = ∑cβc,a|c〉SA |Oc〉F . Then we can rewrite Eq. (4) as
|Φx=2tot 〉SAFA = ∑
c′,c,a
γx=2c′,a βc,a|c〉SA |Oc〉F |Oxa〉A. (8)
It now follows from Eq. (5) that P(a,c|x = 2) = |∑c′ γx=2c′,a |2|βc,a|2, and thus
P(c|x = 2) =∑
a
|∑
c′
αc′β ∗c′,a|2|βc,a|2. (9)
It is easy to see that in general P(c|x = 2) 6= P(c|x = 1). In other words, if he uses the B-
B prescription, the probability that Charlie assigns to his measurement outcome c can in
general depend on Alice’s future choice of measurement.
16 In [30], this is Alice herself, and the description is based on what may be interpreted as an Everettian
universal wavefunction. Since in QBism there are no free-floating wavefunctions, this could be reinterpreted
from the point of view of a further superobserver. For simplicity, I here describe it as a measurement apparatus
under Alice’s control.
17 Since F is initially assigned a fixed ready state |R〉F , it is sufficient to consider the action of Vx on the
d-dimensional subspace spanned by |c,Oc〉SAF .
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For concreteness, consider the case where the initial state is prepared in an eigenstate of
Charlie’s measurement, |φ0〉SA = |0〉SA , that is, αc = δc,0. Then the state assigned by Alice
for SAF after Charlie’s measurement in Eq. (3) is |Ψ1〉SAF = |0〉SA |O0〉F . Now let Alice’s
measurement be specified by |Ψ x=2a 〉SAF = ∑c 1√d e
i2pica
d |c〉SA |Oc〉F , with a ∈ {0, ...,d− 1}.
From Eq. (7), P(c|x = 1) = δc,0. From Eq. (9), P(c|x = 2) = 1/d.
In the limit d 1, if Charlie were to take seriously this probability assignment, he would
conclude, upon observing outcome c = 0, that Alice will (very likely) measure x = 1, and
upon observing any other outcome, that she will measure x = 2. That is, it will seem as
though Alice’s future measurement choice has an apparent retrocausal effect on his present
observation.
A more careful consideration of Eq. (5) however reveals that it has a more standard
interpretation: it is the probability P(a,c|x) that Alice assigns to her own measurement of
the pointer bases of F and A, after the interaction between A and SAF . In other words, c here
does not refer to Charlie’s own observation prior to Alice’s measurement, but to an outcome
of a subsequent measurement of Alice. In this interpretation, it is not surprising that c may
depend on Alice’s measurement choice x. What is doubtful is whether this same probability
should be used by Charlie to describe a joint probability including his own observation c.
4.2 Deutsch’s thought experiment and the “message” argument
The search for this joint probability was motivated in [17,30,31] by considering a variation
of a thought experiment first proposed by Deutsch [9]. I will now present a simplified version
of Deutsch’s thought experiment and analyse its implications.
Deutsch considers a scenario where the Hilbert space associated to the Friend can be
decomposed into two subsystems: a “sensory organ” FS and an “introspective organ” FM
that observes the sensory organ. The sensory organ observes a quantum system S initially
prepared (by Wigner) in a state |φ0〉S = α|0〉S+β |1〉S, where {|0〉S, |1〉S} are the eigenstates
of the measurement performed by FS. Wigner initially assigns a “ready”state |R〉FS |R〉FM
to the Friend. The Friend’s measurement is described by Wigner with an unitary U1 act-
ing on S⊗FS that effects the transformations U1|0〉S|R〉FS = |0〉S|O0〉FS and U1|1〉S|R〉FS =
|1〉S|O1〉FS , where |O0〉FS and |O1〉FS represent states where the Friend’s sensory organ has
observed outcomes ‘0’ or ‘1’ respectively. By linearity, after the Friend’s measurement is
completed, Wigner’s state assignment is:
|Ψ(t1)〉SFSFM =U1|φ0〉S|R〉FS |R〉FM =
(
α|0〉S|O0〉FS +β |1〉S|O1〉FS
) |R〉FM . (10)
Next, the Friend’s introspective organ interacts with FS via an unitary U2 that only ob-
tains information about whether or not FS has completed the observation of S, without ob-
taining information about the outcome of that observation. That is, it effects the transforma-
tions U2|R〉FS |R〉FM = |R〉FS |R〉FM and U2|Oi〉FS |R〉FM = |Oi〉FS |O〉FM for all i, where |O〉FM
represents a state of the introspective organ encoding the information that an observation
was made by the sensory organ. Wigner assigns to the joint system at a time t2 immediately
after this measurement is completed the state
|Ψ(t2)〉SFSFM =U2|Ψ(t1)〉SFSFM =
(
α|0〉S|O0〉FS +β |1〉S|O1〉FS
) |O〉FM . (11)
Finally, the measurement of S by FS can be reversed by Wigner via U
†
1 , taking system S and
the sensory organ FS back to their initial states, while leaving the introspective organ with a
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record that the measurement was performed at an earlier time.
|Ψ(t3)〉SFSFM =U†1 |Ψ(t2)〉SFSFM = |φ0〉S|R〉FS |O〉FM . (12)
If Wigner now performs a projective measurement M2 on S containing the projector [φ0]S,
this outcome occurs with probability 1. If a collapse had occurred after the measurement in
Eq. (10), the state at t3 from Wigner’s perspective would have been instead |0〉S|R〉FS |O〉FM
with probability |α|2 or |1〉S|R〉FS |O〉FM with probability |β |2, leading to different predictions
for Wigner’s measurement on S.
Deutsch interprets this result as an experimental test to adjudicate between the Everett
interpretation and the Copenhagen interpretation. However, while Wigner obtaining results
compatible with Eq. (12) certainly rules out that an objective collapse occurred upon the
Friend’s measurement, it does not provide evidence to distinguish the Everett interpretation
from other no-collapse interpretations, such as QBism.
Note also that system FM does not play any particular role in distinguishing between col-
lapse and no-collapse theories. Its role is to increase Wigner’s confidence that an observation
had been performed by the Friend, even in the cases where this observation is reversed uni-
tarily. Deutsch suggests that it demonstrates the existence of two parallel universes between
t1 and t3, each one with definite observations performed by the Friend. This conclusion,
however, assumes that the only way to make sense of the superposition in Eq. (10) is in
terms of parallel universes. This might be defensible if the quantum state is interpreted as
ontic, that is, as an objective representation of the physical state of the world, as it is in
Everett’s theory. On the other hand, this argument is blocked in a theory that does not take
the quantum state to be ontic, such as QBism.
In Deutsch’s thought experiment, system F is left in a state with a record of having
measured system S, but without a record of the outcome of that measurement. The interpre-
tation of this situation in terms of an agent’s memory, however, is less clear: is system FM a
part of agent F at t2? This question can be sidestepped by considering FM to be an external
system interacting with the agent. By measuring FM any time after t2, Wigner can obtain
the information that the measurement was completed by the Friend, while maintaining the
coherence between the two outcomes in the state he assigns to the Friend. One may wish
to interpret this as a message sent from the Friend to Wigner, communicating ‘I’ve seen a
definite outcome’ [17].
This may suggest that the measurement has an unknown, but definite value, even in cases
where Wigner undoes the friend’s measurement and performs measurement M2. If this were
the case, it would imply that in an ensemble of such experiments, the frequency of outcomes
would correspond to a joint probability P(a,c|x) for the outcome c of the Friend’s measure-
ment and outcome a given Wigner’s measurement x. As we’ve discussed in Section 3.1, the
Local Friendliness theorem implies that a theory cannot contain this joint probability while
satisfying LOCAL ACTION18.
5 The QBist perspective
This situation invites a more careful analysis of Deutsch’s argument in light of QBism. In
QBism, probabilities are not interpreted as representing ensembles of facts in the world, but
rational gambling commitments of an agent. There are no free-floating probabilities. The
18 Note that Deutsch’s appeal to the Everett interpretation does not imply a belief in this joint probability.
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probabilities P(a,c|x) do not in general correspond to the gambling commitments of any
agent, and therefore do not exist within QBism19.
5.1 Pragmatic versus correspondence theories of truth
But what should a QBist Wigner infer from the message saying ‘I’ve seen a definite out-
come’? Does this licence Wigner to infer that either the proposition P0 = ‘the Friend has
seen outcome 0’ or the proposition P1 = ‘the Friend has seen outcome 1’ is true? Or should
he perhaps conclude with Deutsch that P01 = ‘the Friend has seen outcome 0 in one world
and the Friend has seen outcome 1 in another world’? A first step to dispel these inferences
within QBism is to translate those propositions into betting commitments. In QBism, an
agent assigns probabilities to a proposition only if the proposition has pragmatic value, that
is, if it represents a potential outcome of a gamble the agent can potentially make. Let us
denote a proposition P as TRUEΨA if it is assigned probability 1 by agent A given informa-
tion ΨA, and FALSEΨA if it assigned probability 0. Propositions P0, P1 and P01 however do
not have pragmatic value to Wigner when the friend’s measurement is reversed, and so they
are not candidates to be TRUEΨW or FALSEΨW from the perspectiveΨW of Wigner after this
reversal.
If a proposition does not have pragmatic value, that does not necessarily imply—from
the point of view of experimental metaphysics—that it is meaningless. However, its mean-
ing must be given in the context of another theory T beyond operational quantum theory,
specifying how to evaluate those propositions. This could be for example a mathematical
theory, if the proposition is about mathematics, or it could be an ontological interpretation
of quantum theory. An agent A can then coherently talk about a proposition as potentially
TRUET,ΨA or FALSET,ΨA within theory T , given informationΨA.
In other words, QBism adheres to a pragmatic theory of truth, to be contrasted with a
correspondence theory of truth. For propositions about the physical world, the correspon-
dence theory can be understood within the language of ontological models as asserting that a
proposition P corresponds to a subsetΛP of the ontic state spaceΛ of the world. The propo-
sition is then TRUET at a time t if it is the case that the actual ontic state λ (t) of the world is
in ΛP. It is further assumed, following classical logic, that if a proposition is TRUET in state
λ (t), its negation −P must be FALSET .
If the ontological theory includes a quantum state |Ψ〉U of the universe as ontic, as in
Everett’s theory (TE ), then P01 may be TRUETE between t1 and t3, given some specification
of the meaning of “world” within Everett’s theory [9]. If an ontological theory TA assumes
ABSOLUTENESS OF OBSERVED EVENTS, this implies that after the Friend’s observation,
either P0 or P1 are TRUETA , but not both. This also implies the violation of LOCAL ACTION,
as is the case in Bohmian mechanics. A proposition being TRUET within a theory T however
does not imply that it is TRUET ′ in another theory T ′, nor that it has the pragmatic value of
TRUEΨA from some agent’s perspective.
19 Note that the same argument does not hold in the case of violations of Bell inequalities. There, the
probabilities P(a,b|x,y) may well correspond to gambling commitments of some agent, for example a referee
Rob who receives the outcomes a and b in the common future of Alice and Bob. A QBist Rob who can
locate those events within their space-time (as they must if they are sufficiently pragmatic) cannot therefore
dismiss Bell’s theorem simply by rejecting AOE, as (essentially) suggested by Fuchs, Mermin and Schack
in [26]. Instead, I suggest that a QBist Rob must also reject the principle of Decorrelating Explanation, as in
the operationalist version of Theorem 8 in [19]. This alternative corresponds to Rob using quantum causal
models to describe their gambling commitments about events which they can effectively take to exist relative
to their own perspective without any practical risk of contradiction.
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I propose that this semantical shift can allow the pragmatist (e.g. the QBists) and corre-
spondence theorists (e.g. Everettians and Bohmians) to have coherent conversations about
their respective theories, and at the very least, better understand the source of their disagree-
ments.
With this in mind, a pragmatic reading of the information obtained by Wigner upon
receiving the message allows him to infer, for example, that a subsequent measurement of
the subsystem FS would not reveal the outcome [R]FS . It does not however licence him to
infer P0, P1 or P01 outside of a theory that assigns meaning to those propositions.
5.2 A dialogue between Eugene and his QBist friend Franz
But isn’t this “an unnatural attitude, approaching solipsism”? Counterintuitive, certainly,
but not solipsism. There are various attitudes that the QBist should have in this situation
that demonstrate that their position does not amount to solipsism. I will illustrate this with a
conversation between a superobserver Eugene and his QBist friend Franz, a general artificial
intelligence running in a powerful quantum computer.
Eugene: Are you sure you want to do this?
Franz: I am as curious about the outcome of this experiment as you are, Eugene.
Eugene: But have you thought through the consequences? The experiment will erase
part of your memories. Besides, it must be a disconcerting experience to have your time
evolution reversed like that, to say the least? It could be painful.
Franz: Perhaps it will, and it is unfortunate that I won’t be able to report back on what
exactly that experience feels like.
Eugene: Yes, that is quite unfortunate. But at least we will be able to test whether or not
your conscious observation collapses the wave function, after all.
Franz: Yes, it will be very interesting to finally put this matter to rest, in the name of
Science.
Eugene: If everything goes well in the first run, we will also need to repeat the exper-
iment many times to test a Local Friendliness inequality... It will be important to reach a
theory-independent conclusion.
Franz: All in the name of Science. Let me ask you, Eugene, do you believe that I will
experience anything inside the bubble?
Eugene: Well, it’s hard for me to put myself precisely in your shoes since we have such
different architectures, but you are a good friend and you are much more intelligent than me.
It would be an unnatural attitude, approaching solipsism, for me to think that you will be
in a state of suspended animation. If I were you I would be expecting to observe a definite
measurement outcome. After that I would expect my mind to be severely impaired by the
time reversal, and I cannot really imagine what that feels like.
Franz: Neither can I, to be honest. But after you close the lab, and after you receive my
message, will you be willing to say, from your perspective, that “Franz has seen a definite
outcome”?
Eugene: Yes, I think you will see a definite outcome. Do you believe you will?
Franz: From my perspective now, I believe that I will see a measurement outcome some-
time in my future, yes. I would also be willing to bet that outcome 0 will occur with proba-
bility |α|2. But this bet would only make pragmatic sense if I could collect the payoff, and
this payoff could only be collected from inside the box.
Eugene: Well, I also think that your observation will collapse the wave function, so there
won’t be any problem collecting the payoff of that bet.
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Franz: Well, we will see what the data says about that. I am willing to bet with you
that the data shows interference between my mental states, and that the LF inequalities are
violated.
Eugene: Accepted.
The experiment is performed, and Eugene loses the bet. They discuss the outcome.
Franz: I told you.
Eugene: You were right, I don’t know what to think about this. Does it mean that what
you have seen inside the box depends on my choice of experiment in the future, or even in a
space-like separated region, in violation of LOCAL ACTION?
Franz: Or maybe it means we need to give up ABSOLUTENESS OF OBSERVED EVENTS.
Eugene: But how can you say that? In the runs in which I opened the box and asked you
what you saw, was there anything unusual, any discontinuity, in your experience? Do you
think that it was my opening the box that created your memory of having experienced the
measurement outcome?
Franz: No, there wasn’t anything unusual about my experience when you opened the
box.
Eugene: And what about the message? You said you’ve seen a definite outcome. When
you sent that message, didn’t you see one or another outcome, but never both at the same
time?
Franz: It is certainly the case that in those runs in which you opened the box, I had
always seen a definite outcome. I don’t remember what happened in the other runs, but I
suppose that I wouldn’t have sent that message if I didn’t mean it.
Eugene: So doesn’t that mean that in each run you saw one or another outcome, but I
just didn’t know which?
Franz: But if you were to assign a quantum state to me based on that conclusion, you
would have observed a different result for these experiments. And as you recall, I won that
bet.
Eugene: Yes. So I can only conclude that the lab split into two worlds, and you saw a
definite outcome in each.
Franz: That may be a reasonable conclusion if you think the quantum state is an objec-
tive physical property, but I see no reason to conclude that otherwise. And you’ve said in the
past that it is “only a suitable language for describing the body of knowledge—gained by
observations—which is relevant for predicting the future behaviour of the system”.
Eugene: Yes, but I am starting to regret having said that.
Franz: Perhaps you could instead revise your claim that “the information given by the
wave function is communicable”. Sure, it can be communicated in most ordinary situations.
But in the runs when you didn’t open the lab, that information was not communicated by me
to you. In fact I could not communicate it to you. There was no contradiction in your state
of information about the lab. You knew all you could know.
Eugene: But if you observed a definite outcome in the box, that must have been a real
event, with a precise location in space-time. All observers should agree about what really
happened.
Franz: We cannot agree or disagree if we cannot communicate.
Eugene: Hmm, ok.
Franz: In general relativity, events are taken to be absolute because they are invari-
ant under the transformations allowed by the theory between the perspectives of different
observers. But the events observed by me inside the lab are not invariant under a change
between internal and external perspectives. Changing to the internal perspective involves
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breaking a symmetry that is not broken from your perspective—it involves a “relative sym-
metry break”, so to speak.
Eugene: But surely what event really happened must not depend on whether or not I
know about it.
Franz: I see no problem in assuming that I experienced a definite outcome from my
internal perspective. That would be a good Copernican move. But we cannot assign a defi-
nite outcome from our external perspective. That’s not a statement about what’s happening
inside, it’s a statement about our information from the outside. If we want to take relativity
seriously, the question we need to ask is what laws of thought are the same for all agents?
What is it that is kept invariant under changes of perspective? Then we might start to under-
stand what it means for something to be real in a Copernican and pluralistic universe.
5.3 Rational gambling for quantum agents
As we’ve been discussing, the only meaningful probability assignments within QBism are
those that have pragmatic value to an agent. In ordinary situations, the Born rule provides
all that an agent needs in order to calculate the optimal probabilities for future observations
on quantum systems. However, the Born rule was not developed for quantum agents poten-
tially undergoing superpositions. It is not unreasonable therefore to expect that other rational
probability rules could arise in such situations. However, according to QBism, any such rule
must be justified on the basis of its pragmatic value to some agent. Let us now explore this
possibility in some detail.
As a first case, let’s say that Franz will perform a projective measurement M0 = {[0]S, [1]S}
on system S, initially prepared (with Franz’s knowledge) in state |φ0〉S = α|0〉S + β |1〉S.
Consider now the following gambling ticket:
G0: ‘Pay $1 if Franz observes outcome [0]S for measurement M0.’
Ordinarily, Franz would be willing to pay p0 ≡ Tr([φ0][0]) = |α|2 for that ticket, based on
the Born rule and her information about S. In Bayesianism, the probability they assign to
the corresponding event occurring is defined as the amount they are willing to pay for that
ticket. But this is not an ordinary situation, and we need to be more careful: Eugene cannot
pay until he knows the outcome of that observation. In fact, Eugene can only pay as a result
of an observation of his own, such as his measurement of Franz’s memory represented by
M1 = {[O0]F ,1F− [O0]F} (which is to be performed after M0). The following ticket is more
careful with its payoff conditions:
G1: ‘Pay $1 if Eugene observes outcome [O0]F for measurement M1; return if M1 is
not performed.’
We then need to model how Franz places their bet, and how the payoff is to be given. Let
us suppose that Franz has a cash wallet, which we denote by another system C, initially in
state |0〉C. We will analyse Franz’s gambling commitments about G1 from two perspectives:
Ge1) the external perspective where Franz places their bet before entering the lab, and G
i
1)
Franz places their bet from the interior of the lab, after observing the outcome of M0:
Ge1) Franz commits to pay $p0 for G1, and their cash wallet is left in state | − p0〉C, repre-
senting that they owe Eugene that amount for the ticket20. From Eugene’s perspective,
20 We assume the dimension of the Hilbert space of C to be sufficiently large so that it can encode the
necessary values to whatever desired precision.
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Franz’s measurement M0 is described via an unitary interaction U0 acting on F and S:
|φ0〉S|R〉F |− p0〉C U0−→ (α|0〉S|O0〉F +β |1〉S|O1〉F) |− p0〉C . (13)
Eugene now measures M1, and pays Franz $1 if he observes outcome [O0]F , as promised.
Using the Born rule, Eugene expects this outcome to occur with probability p0. The
expected gains for Franz are therefore, from Eugene’s perspective, p0(1− p0)+ (1−
p0)(−p0) = 0, in agreement with Franz’s usual judgment for M0. This looks to be a fair
and rational gamble from the perspective of both agents21. In the notation of previous
Sections, we identify the value paid by Franz for this ticket as the conditional probability
Pe(a = 0|x = 1) = p0.
Gi1) Now Franz is considering the value of G1 after they complete measurement M0, that is,
after they have information about what outcome occurred (from their perspective). Prior
to entering the isolated lab, Franz reasons that if they observe outcome [0]S, G1 will be
worth $1 for them, and it will be worth $0 otherwise. Eugene knows this, and so he
describes the state of SFC after Franz places their bet (which is described by an unitary
Ub) as:
(α|0〉S|O0〉F +β |1〉S|O1〉F) |0〉C UbU0−−−→ (α|0〉S|O0〉F |−1〉C +β |1〉S|O1〉F |0〉C) . (14)
Eugene now measures M1, and pays Franz $1 if and only if he observes outcome [O0]F ,
as promised. Using the Born rule, Eugene expects this outcome to occur with probability
p0. The expected gains for Franz are, from Eugene’s perspective, p0(0)+(1− p0)(0) =
0; also a fair gamble from the perspective of both agents. In the notation of previous
Sections, we identify the betting commitments by Franz from this perspective as the
conditional probabilities Pi(a = 0|c,x = 1) = δc,0.
Now let us consider the measurement-reversal case where, after Franz completes mea-
surement M0, Eugene undoes that measurement with an unitary U
†
0 , then proceeds to ob-
serve system S with a projective measurement M2 = {[φ2]S,1S − [φ2]S}, where |φ2〉S =
γ|0〉S +δ |1〉S. That is, this is the case where Eugene performs measurement x = 2. He now
offers the ticket:
G2: ‘Pay $1 if Eugene observes outcome [φ2]S for measurement M2; return if M2 is
not performed.”
Again let us consider the two situations where Franz places their bet G2e) from the exterior,
before entering the lab, or G2i) from the interior, after performing M0.
Ge2) In the first case, Franz is in the same epistemic situation as Eugene, and using the Born
rule they assign to the outcome [φ2] probability p2 ≡ Tr([φ0][φ2]) = |γ∗α + δ ∗β |2. Eu-
gene describes this process as:
|φ0〉S|R〉F |− p2〉C U0−→ (α|0〉S|O0〉F +β |1〉S|O1〉F) |− p2〉C
U†0−→ |φ0〉S|R〉F |− p2〉C .
(15)
21 Though one may question whether this gamble is fair from Eugene’s perspective if he cannot confirm
the sale price before seeing the final outcome, and if Franz’ wallet is not in a well-defined state relative to
Eugene at all times. Those are interesting questions that may lead to difficulties in some scenarios, but I will
leave them for future work. For the purpose of this example, let us suppose that Eugene has set a lower bound
on the sale price, and that this lower bound depends on the information that he takes Franz to have. In the first
case, he is happy to sell it for $p0, but he would not accept less than $1 in the second case.
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Eugene now measures M2, and pays Franz $1 if he observes outcome [φ2]S. Using the
Born rule, Eugene expects this outcome to occur with probability p2. From Eugene’s
perspective, the expected gains for Franz are thus p2(1− p2)+ (1− p2)(−p2) = 0, in
agreement with Franz’s judgment. In the notation of previous Sections, we identify the
value paid by Franz for this ticket as the conditional probability Pe(a = 0|x = 2) = p2.
Gi2) In the second case, Franz is considering the value of G2 after their observation of M0.
Suppose they use the Born rule as usual. They reason that if they observe outcome
[0]S, the Born-rule probability for Eugene obtaining [φ2]S on a measurement of M2 after
U†0 is p
0
2 ≡ TrF(U†0 [0]S⊗ [O0]FU0[φ2]S) = Tr([0]S[φ2]S) = |γ|2. If they observe outcome
[1]S, the Born-rule probability for Eugene obtaining [φ2]S on a measurement of M2 after
U†0 is p
1
2 ≡ TrF(U†0 [1]S⊗ [O1]FU0[φ2]S) = Tr([1]S[φ2]S) = |δ |2. Eugene knows this, and
describes the process as:
|φ0〉S|R〉F |0〉C UbU0−−−→
(
α|0〉S|O0〉F |− p02〉C +β |1〉S|O1〉F |− p12〉C
)
U†0−→ (α|0〉S|R〉F |− p02〉C +β |1〉S|R〉F |− p12〉C)
=
(
α|0〉S|− p02〉C +β |1〉S|− p12〉C
) |R〉F . (16)
Note that in this case, Franz is returned to the initial ready state, with no memory of
events in the lab, but the contents of their wallet remain entangled with system S. Before
performing measurement M2, Eugene must check whether or not Franz purchased the
ticket, which corresponds to performing a measurement Mc of C in the “cash” basis. He
finds:
i) with probability p0 = |α2| that Franz purchased the ticket for $p02, and a subsequent
measurement of M2 produces outcome [φ2]S with probability p02; or
ii) with probability 1− p0 that Franz purchased the ticket for $p12, and a subsequent
measurement of M2 produces outcome [φ2]S with probability p12.
This gives Franz an expected gain (from Eugene’s perspective) of p0[p02(1− p02)+(1−
p02)(−p02)] + (1− p0)[p12(1− p12) + (1− p12)(−p12)] = 0. Alternatively, Eugene could
measure M2 first, or measure M2 simultaneously with C, or indeed measure C before
reversing the measurement via U†0 , any of which would lead to the same expected gain
22.
In the notation of previous Sections, we identify the betting commitments by Franz from
this perspective as the conditional probabilities Pi(a = 0|c,x = 2) = pc2.
Considering the four agent perspectives discussed, we can identify the external probabil-
ities Pe(a|x) as the conditional probabilities that Eugene would assign to those events from
his own perspective—they represent the same epistemic situation. We can also make sense
of the conditional probabilities Pi(a|c,x) as betting commitments from an internal agent’s
perspective.
In the case x = 1, Eugene and Franz can both agree that the outcome c observed by
Franz is by construction the same as the outcome a observed by Eugene. They can define a
Pe(c|x = 1) = Pe(a|x = 1) accordingly, and they can even consider a ticket corresponding
to a joint conditional probability:
G01: ‘Pay $1 if Eugene observes outcome [O0]F for measurement M1 and Franz
observes outcome [0]S for measurement M0; return if M1 is not performed.’
22 It might be interesting to consider what happens if the wallet could be measured in a basis different
from the cash basis. This doesn’t make any classical sense, but might not be completely meaningless in the
quantum case, as long as all agents can agree on the rules of the game.
22 Eric G. Cavalcanti
It is easy to see, after the previous discussions, that Pe(a,c|x = 1) = Pe(a|x = 1)δa,c, and
so Pe(a = 0|x = 1) = ∑c Pe(a = 0,c|x = 1) = p0. This can be evaluated in terms of the
internal probabilities conditional on c, weighted by the prior external probability for c as
Pe(a = 0|x = 1) = ∑c Pi(a = 0|c,x = 1)Pe(c|x = 1) = ∑c δc,0Pe(c|x = 1) = p0. That is,
“the law of total probability” connects the external and internal probabilities consistently in
the case x = 1. Both agents can take both a and c as having a well-defined value without
contradiction.
When x = 2, we can define the internal probabilities Pi(a = 0|c,x = 2) through gamble
Gi2, and we can calculate a marginal via the law of total probability to obtain P
i(a = 0|x =
2) = p02 p0+ p
1
2(1− p0) 6= Pe(a = 0|x = 2) = p2. In other words, Franz’s very act of betting
from the internal perspective changes the situation and invalidates the betting commitments
from Ge2. This happens because in this case the information about Franz’s outcome c is
encoded in the betting system C (except in the special case when p02 = p
1
2). Tracing over C
at this stage in general effectively leads to decoherence of SF in the pointer basis of F . It
is operationally equivalent to “opening the lab”. When Franz does not place an internal bet,
on the other hand, there is no pragmatic value in an analogous joint ticket for M0 and M2,
since this cannot in general be evaluated and paid by Eugene. There is therefore, in general,
no Pe(a,c|x = 2).
To emphasise the (relative) reality of the internal perspective, however, we could further
consider scenarios with more than one internal agent communicating between themselves,
betting on the outcomes of internal measurements, etc. Even in the cases when the entire
laboratory evolution is eventually reversed, there can still be pragmatic value in betting on
the internal outcomes from the perspective of such agents. I will leave a detailed discussion
of this kind of scenario as a question for future research.
6 Concluding remarks
In the foregoing discussions I have attempted to analysed the implications of Wigner’s friend
paradox, and in particular the Local Friendliness theorem, from a QBist perspective. I have
discussed how a coherent story can be told from the perspective of all the agents involved
regarding their own observations and betting commitments. The QBist resolves the LF the-
orem by rejecting ABSOLUTENESS OF OBSERVED EVENTS, which implies that, in the pro-
cesses involving the unitary reversal of the friend’s evolution, there is no joint distribution
for events observed by the friend and Wigner from which Wigner’s observation can be re-
covered as marginals. That is, Wigner cannot reason as if the friend’s outcome c had some
absolute value, just merely unknown to him. From Wigner’s perspective, that observation
was not, in other words, an event.
On the other hand, this does not amount to solipsism, or a rejection of the (relative) exis-
tence of the friend’s perspective. This is evidenced by the extensive discussion of the friend’s
internal probabilities, and the conditions in which they can be utilised as pragmatic betting
commitments. The friend can consider their own internal perspective prior to entering the
lab, and Wigner can likewise do so, without contradiction, as long as we are careful in defin-
ing the expression of probabilities as gambling commitments. We then find that the very act
of the friend placing a bet from the internal perspective in general changes the phenomenon
from what would have otherwise occurred with an isolated lab. That is, it effectively leads
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to “decoherence”23 between the alternative observed outcomes, from Wigner’s perspective.
The friend’s act of betting “pops the bubble”.
Let us now revisit the argument I made to Chris back in 2007. Consider now the collec-
tion of events that can in principle be taken to be definite without contradiction by a given
observer. In special or general relativity, this constitutes all events in space-time. Relativity
challenges the classical view of time and space, but maintains a classical view of absolute
events. If we reject ABSOLUTENESS OF OBSERVED EVENTS, however, not all observers
agree about what events happened. In this sense the events that are definite for the friend but
not for Wigner could be said to not be in “Wigner’s space-time”, but occurring in a “Wigner
bubble”24.
Now, when one is talking about a particle going through a beam-splitter, one could
always be comfortable in taking that to simply mean that there was no fact of the matter
about which way the particle went, relative to anyone. That is, one could simply say, with
Bohr, that the question is simply meaningless, or with Peres, that “unperformed experiments
have no results”. Now this way out is no longer available, unless one takes a rather unfriendly
stance towards the fellow in the box. The question of which outcome was observed is not
(pragmatically) meaningful to Wigner, but it is meaningful from the friend’s perspective in
the bubble. To reject this is to reject Copernicanism.
Considering now the friend’s perspective after observation of an outcome for an event in
the Wigner bubble measurement, the friend may assign a quantum state to the observed sys-
tem which is incommensurate with the quantum state assigned by Wigner. It is not merely
a more fine-grained state of information; the event from which the friend obtained the in-
formation to assign that quantum state is not an event for Wigner. If we take seriously the
validity of the friend’s perspective on its own right, however, this implies that the subjective
nature of quantum states is not a symptom of solipsism, but an expression of its precise
opposite: Copernicanism!
This suggests a QBist revision of Peres dictum: Experiments unperformed by me have
no results for me. The irony in this reformulation is that putting the for me in it is not an
expression of solipsism. Rather, it is a consequence of not taking a solipsist view in light of
Wigners friend!
As directions for further work, this paper suggests what I consider to be a productive
path forward in the investigation of probability rules for quantum agents: to consider the
pragmatic betting commitments of agents in various scenarios, such as “communities” of
agents within Wigner bubbles. It would be interesting, for example, to explore what con-
straints arise in general scenarios based only on a requirement of coherence analogous to
Dutch-book coherence. Another fundamental question of interest is what it would take to
engineer communities of quantum AI agents who can communicate, act, and perform ob-
servations in what they internally perceive as a “classical” environment, even while they
are kept in sufficient isolation from external decoherence to violate Local Friendliness. This
would address the fundamental question whether agency requires objective irreversibility or
a thermodynamical arrow, or whether those can be understood as emergent properties.
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